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LAWYERS AS STRANGERS AND FRIENDS: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR SAMMONS
Thomas L. Shaffer*
Robert F. Cochran, Jr.**
Our thanks to the editors of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Law Journal for the opportunity to respond to Jack Sammons' review of our
recent book.' We are honored to be taken seriously by someone as
thoughtful as Sammons. We especially like his suggestion that, "[I]t would
be good for everyone in the legal profession to pay attention to what Shaffer
and Cochran have done here."2 (We hope they all buy copies of the book.)
We see his book review (as we know he sees it) as moral discourse among
friends; we respond in the same spirit. Though Sammons credits us with
"the first good heuristic model ... for moral counseling in the law office,"
he thinks we "have the model all wrong."3 We think that, in many respects,
he furthers the understanding of what it means to be a lawyer and a good
person; but, in some respects, he misreads us, and in other respects he is
wrong.
I. ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF FRIENDSmP AND OURS
In our book, we identify four models of lawyers, each of which gives
a different combination of answers to the questions: (1) Who controls the
representation? and (2) Are the interests of those other than the client
important? The lawyer as godfather controls the representation and ignores
the interests of others;4 the lawyer-as-hired gun defers to the client and
ignores the interests of others;5 the lawyer-as-guru controls the representation
and considers the interests of others;6 the lawyer-as-friend raises moral
issues, discusses them, and resolves them with the client.' The lawyer-as-
friend is our preferred model.
* Robert & Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
** Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.
1. Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochran's Friendship Model
of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1995) (reviewing
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1994)).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 5-14 (1994).
5. Id. at 15-29.
6. Id. at 30-39.
7. Id. at 40-54, 113-34.
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A concern with the goodness of the friend was central to the traditional
notion of friendship.8 Such a concern was also present in the notion of
friendship modem American lawyers grew up with and learned to practice.
Even if moral counsel is not as prominent as pleasure in the relationship of
modem friends, it is always present in any relatively clear account of what
friendship is-from theological ethics to television situation comedy.
Sammons takes us to task for our use of Aristotle in our model of
friendship. He suggests that Aristotle's notion of friendship is intimately
bound up in his notion of a city-state in which citizens share a common
morality.9 In that classical locale, friends can call one another to a common
morality. Sammons suggests that modem American lawyers and clients are
more often "rank strangers" and that the lawyer who pretends that she lives
in an Aristotelian city-state and shares morals with her clients is likely to
impose her values on clients (and to fool herself into believing that the
clients participate in the decision). I" Sammons claims that the lawyers with
which we illustrate our model have such delusions. He is wrong about that.
Sammons errs first in assuming that we think the lawyer and client
could be or should be what Aristotle called true friends. As we say often
(and as Sammons at times acknowledges") we use friendship as an analogy
to the relationship we propose for the lawyer and client. 2 We no more
suggest that our lawyer is an Aristotelian friend to all of his or her clients
than that the lawyers in the other models that we explore head Mafia-related
organizations, shoot people at the direction of the ranch's boss, or sit in
lotus position while their followers offer worship. We chose the analogy of
friends because we think it captures the combination of moral responsibility,
respect for client dignity, and moral discourse that should be part of the
lawyer-client relationship.
We point to Aristotle as one who talked about friendship as a moral
relationship, but in this, as in so many other areas, Aristotle is part of a
tradition, a tradition that extends over many ages and many different
cultures. We use not only Aristotle but the Jewish philosopher Martin
Buber, 3 the Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas, "' the Protestant theologian
8. Id. at 44-48.
9. Sammons, supra note 1, at 22. Sammons emphasizes the difference between
Aristotle's and our experience of friendship. What is more surprising are the similarities.
Though separated by a few millennia and half a world, Aristotle's description of friendship
as a moral relationship carries the ring of truth.
10. Sammons, supra note 1, at 27-28.
11. Sammons, supra note 1, at 10.
12. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 45.
13. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 47.
14. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 48.
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Karl Barth, 5 the characters of modem novelist Wendell Berry, %hodem
playwright Robert Bolt, 7 and 19th century novelist Anthony Trollope l8 to
describe our notion of friendship as a moral relationship. It is not a notion
that is limited to the Greek city-state.
Our choice of friendship as a model comes also from our own
experience of friendship. That experience has been, not in Aristotle's city-
state, but in groups with which we share varying levels of difference,
ranging from small intimate Christian fellowship groups-sometimes of only
two or three---with whom we share much in common,' 9 to groups composed
of those who are quite different from us. With these others, the shared basis
for the friendship is not as great, but, in some respects, with these other
friends, the opportunity to learn is greater. Thus, it may be that a lawyer
who shares her client's moral tradition will be quicker to point to the
implications of that shared tradition and more likely to persuade a client to
follow them; but clients from another tradition will be more likely to
broaden the lawyer's moral insight.
In class, when we suggest that students might talk with clients about
moral issues as they would with "a close friend" (Thomas Morgan's
phrase),20 the notion seems to ring true. We perceive that most people have
friends with whom they can discuss the good. Though students do not
initially talk of friendship as a moral relationship, it appears that their
experience of friendship is better than their understanding of it. Just as
Robert Bellah found that people in the United States have a hard time
talking about their very real experience of community,2 we find that
students have a hard time talking about friendship as a moral relationship.
The important thing here is not the characterization of the friendship,
but the goal and tendency of it--and, most of all, the exercise of the virtue
of friendship. What we are after, in a book on legal ethics, is not what a
lawyer will find in the law office; it is what she will work to bring about
there. If the adjective had not been hopelessly diluted by commercialism,
we would say that what we point to is being friendly, and then to Aristotle's
understanding that the exercise of the virtue of friendship is possible in all
15. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 48.
16. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 53-54.
17. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 26-27.
18. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 94-101.
19. An early such group in which we shared as teacher and student was the springboard
to THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981). See id. at 227.
20. Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REV. 439,
455-59 (1990).
21. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
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sorts of encounters, from "base" friendships for pleasure or profit to the
richest and deepest "collaboration in the good."22
Sammons suggests that there are insufficient common moral resources
for moral discourse in the law office and that the assumption behind our
lawyer-as-friend that there are common moral resources will lead the
lawyer-as-friend to self-deceptively manipulate the client. We think that
there is more room for common discourse than Sammons suggests: ninety
percent of the population in the United States identify themselves as part of
the Christian and Jewish traditions and these traditions have significant
moral overlap.23 The popularity of William Bennett's The Book of Virtues:
A Treasury of Great Moral Stories24 among diverse social groups in the
United States provides support for our suggestion that justice, mercy, and
truthfulness are values that lawyer and client can fruitfully discuss and
practice in the law office.
Sammons suggests that we distort these values as they have been
"deeply defined through the long narrative processes of interpretive
communities" by "treating them as abstracted principles. 25  But that is
simply not an accurate characterization of our book. Among the dozen
stories that we tell (or re-tell) is the story of the Good Samaritan,26 a story
from our Christian tradition which illustrates the virtue of mercy. It is our
sense that it is a story that has power across cultural traditions. The stories
that William Bennett repeats in The Book of Virtues come from particular
traditions, yet its popularity suggests that Bennett's stories speak of values
that run through other traditions as well.27
It may also be that lawyers can call clients to the moral values of client
traditions that they do not share. A lawyer may be at her best in moral
22. For a lengthy analysis of Aristotelian friendship in reference to two of the legal
profession's modem regulatory rules, see Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule
Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy and "The Manner That Is The Man Himself " 7
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145 (1993).
23. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 60.
24. WiLLAM BENNETT, THE BOOK OF ViRTuES: A TREASURY OF GREAT MORAL STORIES
(1993).
25. Sammons, supra note 1, at 23-24.
26. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 70.
27. Sammons' own notion of the lawyer as rhetorician, discussed at Sammons, supra
note 1, at 44-59 and at infra text accompanying notes 65-71, is dependent on a sharing of
moral values over a much broader community than our notion of lawyer-client moral
discourse. We assume that the lawyer and client will have a sufficient overlap in moral
values to engage in moral discourse about issues that arise in legal representation. Sammons
assumes that the community will have a sufficient overlap in moral values to resolve disputes
if lawyers enable clients to tell their stories-he describes the lawyer as making "a communal
claim about what type of community this community is and is to be." Sammons, supra note
1, at 38.
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counseling when she asks questions. For example, "What would be fair?"
is likely to push a client to consider the teachings of his own moral
tradition.
II. OUR LAWYER-AS-FRIEND: ANN WELCH AND THE ZONING CASE
We introduce the concept of the lawyer-as-friend, a lawyer who brings
moral issues into the discussion, but does not impose her values on the
client, in Chapter Four of our book. We present our model of the lawyer-
as-friend, our suggestion of "how to do it," in Chapter Ten. There, we
suggest that moral discourse with a client will involve four elements:
1) Client Involvement: establishing the sort of relationship with the
client in which the client will be comfortable talking about moral concerns.
2) Moral Sensitivity: recognition of the harm that different options
might cause to other people. A lawyer might raise such a concern with the
client by asking, as to each alternative that lawyer and client might pursue,
"Who gets hurt?"
3) Moral Judgment: deciding what would be the right thing to do. A
lawyer might raise this question with a client by asking, "What would be
fair?" With most clients, this will cause the client to look to his own
sources of moral value in deciding what to do.
4) Moral Motivation: deciding to do the right thing. Often empathy
acts as a source of moral motivation. A lawyer might appropriately
stimulate empathy by encouraging the client to interact with the other
party.
2 8
In the story that we use to illustrate our model of the lawyer-as-friend,
a home for retarded men is seeking to have the zoning changed in a client's
neighborhood so that they can move in. The lawyer, Ann Welch, pursues
the agenda suggested above. Along the way, she proposes and arranges a
meeting between the client family and the men from the home.29 In the
story, the meeting serves two purposes that facilitate moral decision-making.
First, it increases moral sensitivity. It enables the clients to understand the
harm that would come to the men if they have to remain in their old
neighborhood. Second, the meeting creates moral motivation; the clients
develop some empathy for the men.
Sammons criticizes Ann for encouraging the clients to meet with the
men. He sees Ann Welch's actions in sending the client to the home as
28. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 113-34.
29. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 124-25.
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manipulative.3" He has it backwards. Manipulation would have been to
distort reality in order to push the client to do the lawyer's bidding. It
would have been manipulative to present the men to the clients in a
scrubbed-up, artificial way, on their best behavior in the law office, for
example. By inviting the clients to go where the men lived, Ann Welch
increased their understanding of reality. The visit might have confirmed the
clients' fears. The point is, as St. Paul said, that "Love rejoices in the
truth."
We find Sammons' criticism especially surprising in light of his model
of the lawyer, the lawyer-as-rhetorician, one who encourages conversation.31
Meeting the men began the conversation, a conversation that will continue
if the clients decide to pursue negotiations. We doubt that much of a
conversation would have occurred if the clients did no more than oppose the
zoning change at a hearing before the zoning board.32
Sammons does not address our other suggestions for the lawyer-as-
friend. Questions such as, "Who gets hurt?" (raising moral sensitivity) and,
"What would be fair?" (stimulating moral judgment) can generate moral
discourse, without imposing the lawyer's values on the client. Some might
suggest that identifying the interests of others and raising the question of
fairness is to impose. As Sammons says, some feel that to raise is to
impose.33 We do not suggest that the lawyer should not influence the client
(some would suggest that to influence is to impose); there is a significant
difference between influence and imposition. Sammons' lawyer may make
the opposite error. For the lawyer to fail to raise these issues and talk only
of the client's story and the client's interests would leave us with the
lawyer-as-hired gun--and Sammons does not like that any more than we do.
III. JARAMILLO AND THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
Sammons spends much of his review criticizing a lawyer in one of the
stories that we tell. The lawyer Jaramillo advises his client concerning a
30. Sammons, supra note 1, at 40.
31. Sammons, supra note 1, at 44. For our discussion of Sammons' model of the
lawyer-as-rhetorician, see infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
32. Sammons emphasizes the importance of the client being able to tell his story. Often
clients are unable to tell their stories in court or before government bodies: one of the most
common complaints of citizens in litigation is that they are unable to tell their stories.
Sammons also suggests that Ann distorted the costs to the clients of allowing the men
to move into their community. Sammons, supra note 1, at 40 n.144. She did not. For
example, she asked how much the value of the client's home would go down if the men
moved into the neighborhood. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 122.
33. Sammons, supra note 1, at 3.
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real estate commission claimed by a real estate agent. The commission is
probably unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. Jaramillo wonders
out loud about the justice of claiming the statute of frauds. Sammons
criticizes Jaramillo as if Jaramillo were our model of client moral counsel-
ing,34 but Jaramillo is not our model. "
We tell the story of Jaramillo as a way to suggest our concern for the
client's exercise of the virtue of justice. We present the dialogue as a
teaching tool. We think it presents a realistic picture of the kind of moral
conversation that goes on in law offices. We praise Jaramillo for leaving
the responsibility of the decision on the client and for treating the interests
of others seriously in the conversation.36 We criticize him for his failure to
involve the client in the decision-making process" and refer the reader to
Chapter Ten where we present Ann Welch as a better example of lawyer-
client moral counsel.38
In our teacher's manual, that accompanies copies of our textbook that
the publisher sends to teachers, we suggest that the teacher have the class
analyze the dialogue in the Jaramillo story.39 It is our experience (and we
think Jack Sammons') that students learn more if they have the good, the
34. Sammons, supra note 1, at 27, 28-34.
35. That Jaramillo is not our model, and that Ann Welch (discussed in the prior section)
is our model, is quite clear in the book. Chapter Four of the book introduces the notion of
the lawyer as friend at a theoretical level, with the discussion of Aristotle, Aquinas, Barth,
etc. At the end of that chapter, we say:
We have yet to show how a lawyer might raise moral issues and focus the
discussion on the values of the client. In Chapter Ten (Ann Welch's story], we
will present a structure for moral discourse and illustrate it with a dialogue
between a client and lawyer. But first, a look at the moral values that are likely
to be the subject of lawyer-client moral discourse.
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 54. The story of Jaramillo, which we present in
Chapter Six, illustrates the way that justice issues arise in legal representation. It does not
illustrate our model of moral counsel. We introduce it merely as "a law office story that
raises [a corrective justice] concern." SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 63. It is not
even our story; we credit it to Louis Brown, SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 63 n.9,
who also presented it, not as a model, but as an opportunity to critique the moral counsel that
goes on.
36. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 65.
37. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 66.
38. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 4, at 67.
39. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., TEACHER'S MANUAL To
ACCOMPANY LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 39 (1984).
We realize that citations to teacher's manuals are not standard fare for law review
articles, but our teacher's manual has already made one of the lesser known journals for the
point, generated by our earlier exchange with Jack Sammons, that at times clients "seek out
a lawyer because the lawyer is not one of their friends." Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at
the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE
L.J. 1545, n.133 (1995) (citing SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 39, at 30).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
bad, and the quizzical to discuss in a dialogue. We say that the story
presents "an example of a moral conversation, but not a perfect example.'"
We criticize Jaramillo: "[H]e does operate a bit parentally: He does not ask
his client about [moral concerns]; he tells his client about them.' 1
Sammons carries on the criticism of Jaramillo in a way that we think a good
teacher and a good class might do. (We may include his observations in the
next edition of the teacher's manual.)
Sammons criticizes Jaramillo for failing to raise the question of the
fairness of the real estate commission. If Jaramillo had followed our model
for moral discourse, discussed in the prior section, the question, "What
would be fair?" would have led Jaramillo and his client into the question of
the fairness of the real estate agent's requested fee. (Unfortunately,
Jaramillo does not follow our model, but then our book had not been
published at that time.)
IV. INTEGRITY, WITHDRAWAL, AND BEING PART OF THE PRACTICE
Sammons also criticizes our position that lawyers should withdraw or
refuse to take action for a client when they believe that the client wants the
lawyer to do something that is morally wrong. He suggests that our model
of the lawyer-as-friend grows out of our concern for our students' integrity,42
and it does. But it also grows out of our concern for the integrity of their
clients. Our model seeks to respect the integrity of lawyers and clients.
Only a critic who is obsessed with autonomy-which Sammons otherwise
is not-would suggest that this sort of integrity is misplaced.
Difficult moral issues--the kind that often arise in the law office-are
likely to be issues over which reasonable people could differ. If forced to
address such issues people would decide one way or the other, but most
would be hesitant to say that theirs is the only moral solution. Some, of
course, have a firm opinion about every moral issue. Examples include the
county judge of courthouse lore, who was "often in error, but never in
doubt," and Atticus Finch's sister, Alexandra, who "went to school [when]
self-doubt could not be found in any textbook, so she knew not its meaning.
... [G]iven the slightest chance she would exercise her royal prerogative:
she would arrange, advise, caution, and warn.' ' 3  We think that most
lawyers, unlike Aunt Alexandra, understand the complexity of moral issues.
(As Anthony Kronman has suggested, this perception of complexity may in
40. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 39, at 42.
41. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 39, at 42.
42. Samons, supra note 1, at 34.
43. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 128 (1960).
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part be a product of the case method in law school, under which students are
forced to identify the strengths of opposing moral positions.") At the
opposite extreme, there are people who never think that anything is wrong,
but we think there are few lawyers that fit into that category. (Kronman
suggests that lawyers' habits are helpful here as well: Lawyers have to
think about cases from the perspective of judges, from a perspective that
considers the interests of others.45)
It is likely to be the unusual case in which a client's position is so
clearly wrong that a lawyer must withdraw. In part this is because, as
Sammons says:
Good lawyers tend to see 'Valid claims of injustice on all sides of all
disputes and thus it is easier for them to side with their clients because
they know that we cannot determine what justice might mean for us as
a community in the context of this dispute without the client's story
being well told.'
But, at times, the lawyer's integrity will require her to withdraw.
Here again, the analogy to the way friends interact is helpful. If one
of your friends discovers that, despite his best efforts, his son is selling
drugs and asks you whether he should turn his son in, you might express an
opinion on the issue, but you are likely to support your friend either way.
If your friend is selling drugs, you might strongly oppose him and even
distance yourself from your friend. If your friend is considering bombing
the federal building to protest U.S. firearms policy, you might turn him in.
We suggest that most moral problems that arise in the law office are like the
first of these examples. Good people might resolve them in different ways,
and the conscientious lawyer (though she might have decided differently
than did the client) will support and work for the client.
This is the way we see the issue in the zoning story that illustrates our
proposed method of moral counseling. We suppose that Ann Welch would
have sought some sort of accommodation if it were her house in the zoning
dispute--that is what creates the moral tension. But she does not believe
that it would be morally wrong for the clients to oppose the zoning change,
nor that it would be morally wrong for her to help them. If she had thought
it would be morally wrong, we think that she would have withdrawn.4 7
44. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 113-15 (1993). Kronman suggests that the case method leads to an
understanding of the incommensurability of moral values, and ultimately to either stoicism
or cynicism. Id. at 118. Our hope is that it might rather lead to humility in seeking truth.
45. Id. at 117-19.
46. Sammons, supra note 1, at 32 n.122.
47. Sammons wonders why Ann would be willing to go with the client either way.
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Sammons appears to envision a lawyer who is quick to make moral
judgments, and he suggests that the only moral options are a lawyer who
withdraws whenever she would decide differently than the client48 or a role
morality in which the lawyer will make any argument for any client. We
prefer our lawyer; we think she shows more respect for clients.
Sammons suggests that our position will encourage lonely moral
autonomy and moral rebellion.49 We do not discuss how the lawyer comes
to the decision to withdraw, but in our experience it is far from the lonely
autonomy suggested by Sammons. We see morals as communal in nature,
and decisions such as this would be made following moral discussion with
the client and within the law firm and (to the extent possible, respecting
confidentiality) within the family and religious congregation." Even if
discussion within the family and religious congregation is not possible, the
decisions for most lawyers will flow from morals learned in the family and
religious congregation.
We were surprised to see Sammons' suggestion that, in encouraging
lawyers to refuse to take actions when they find them to be immoral, we
undermine the practice."' He finds our notion that lawyers might stand in
judgment of the practice "appalling."52  He sees our criticism of the
profession as "moral rebellion."53 Sammons wraps his vision of lawyering
in the mantle of the practice, but, in fact, the practice is much broader than
he suggests.
A practice, in the sense in which Sammons uses it here, is a tradition
that generates internal goods, satisfactions from involvement in the practice
that all within the practice can enjoy.' An example of an internal good for
lawyers is the joy at seeing justice done in a case or reconciliation in a
Sammons, supra note 1, at 39-40.
48. Sammons, supra note 1, at 40.
49. Sammons suggests that our argument that when confronted with moral conflict in
the practice of law, the lawyer should be true to her moral values goes over well with
students. On the contrary, we find that many students find this suggestion to be troubling.
They find greater comfort in the prospect of a life that enables them to split their morals
between home and work. Some would like to escape to a role.
50. We have in mind what John Howard Yoder calls the "communal quality" of belief
and therefore of moral deliberation. JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM 15-45
(1984).
51. Sammons, supra note 1, at 8, 34 n.126.
52. Sammons, supra note 1, at 34 n.126.
53. Sammons, supra note 1, at 35.
54. "Practice" is ambiguous in this context. What Sammons and we are talking about
for the most part is the notion of the practice that is described, from Aristotle, in ALASDAIR
McINTYRE, 11 AFTER VIRTUE 475-83 (1982), excerpted in THOMAs L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN
LEGAL ETHICS 417-24 (1985). Sometimes, though, Sammons and we use the term as it is
used in "the practice of law." Our hope is that the two usages will describe the same reality.
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neighborhood, whether the lawyers are involved in the matter or not. The
practice may also generate external goods (money, power, prestige) which
benefit the individual that accumulates them, but it is the internal goods that
make something a practice. A practice teaches virtues. For example, there
must be fidelity to those in the practice, truthfulness among those in a
practice, and humility and a willingness to learn from those who have
preceded one in a practice, before one can benefit from being in a practice.
To the extent that law continues to be a practice, we write within it.
We write as lawyers who have had a broad range of experience practicing
law. Each of us has practiced law for several years in addition to teaching,
one of us in a general litigation practice in a small town, the other in a big
city, big firm practice and in a legal clinic for poor people. Between us, we
have trained thousands of lawyers in the nuts and bolts of law practice in
both the substantive law of torts, family law, property, and trusts and estates,
and the skills courses of trial practice, negotiation, client interviewing and
counseling, as well as legal ethics. We speak within the practice, as
beneficiaries of the practice, to the practice.
At one point, Sammons praises "the constant inquiry that goes on
within all good practices about the morality of the role created by the
practice." 55 We see our book as part of that inquiry, rather than something
apart from it. Far from suggesting that one cannot be a good lawyer,56 our
attempt is to help to describe what a good lawyer does. We see the
practice, not as a "moral threat,",57 but as a moral opportunity.
Our argument that the lawyer should not play a role that is contrary to
her morals is an argument that has a strong pedigree within the practice.
The traditional lawyer, e.g., Atticus Finch, of To Kill a Mockingbird, did not
play a role. One of the themes of the book is that Atticus was the same
person at the office that he was at home. The early lawyers in this country
taught that the lawyer should not argue a position that he does not believe
in.58 Even today's Model Rules allow a lawyer to withdraw, in most
circumstances, if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers repugnant or imprudent."59
Sammons' suggestion that moral reform must come from within the
practice' is right, but only in a sense--in the sense that the practice, being
55. Sammons, supra note 1, at 37 n.137.
56. See Sammons, supra note 1, at 37 n.137.
57. Sammons, supra note 1, at 34, 37 n.137.
58. David Hoffman identified the professional ideal in his "Resolutions in Regard to
Professional Deportment," in his COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed. 1836), reprinted in
SHAFFER, supra note 54, at 59ff.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 16(b)(3) (1983).
60. Sammons, supra note 1, at 44.
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a theater for the virtues, is capable of moral regeneration. But people do not
come into a practice without moral formation. The most important morals
our students have are the morals they bring to us law teachers from family,
neighborhood, and congregation. Our keenest obligation to them is to honor
that moral formation.6
Often, reform of the profession comes from without. Our criticism of
the traditional lawyer--that he is paternalistic-has its source in moral
formation from outside of the practice: Our religious tradition taught us
respect for personal dignity. Another example of a reform in the legal
profession that has its moral roots outside the practice is the ADR move-
ment; its roots are in religious practices of dispute resolution.62
We are as concerned as Sammons that the practice of law remain (or
again become) a practice in which the members of the profession are
concerned with the internal goods of the practice. We fear, as he does, that
the practice of law is too concerned with external goods--power, prestige,
money. But Sammons may here do what he accuses us of doing: He holds
up an Aristotelian ideal that is so foreign to the experience of today's
lawyers as to be counterproductive. Where we use Aristotelian friendship
as an analogy for relationships with clients, Sammons suggests that the
practice of law is the real Aristotelian thing. There is a danger there that the
term "practice" will lose its moral roots and that the moral legitimacy which
it carries will be used to justify the self-serving things lawyers do-just as
the term professional (which originally meant to profess something 63-in the
case of lawyers, something about justice) has been coopted by the ad-
versarial elitist advocates in the Bar. To the extent that Sammons equates
the notion of the practice merely with what is common among lawyers, or
with the adversary system, or with the rules of the profession, we fear that
he furthers that process.
In the end, the strongest evidence that law practice needs moral
influences from without is the state of the legal profession. As numerous
observers of the legal scene, from late night comedians to law professors at
61. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER AND MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES, chs. 7 & 8 (1991), where such notions are explored in reference to Italian-
American lawyers. Friendship, as described there is a good habit, a skill, that a lawyer has
learned to practice in the family and therefore knows how to practice in neighborhood, town,
and profession.
62. Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. and Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J.
1660 (1985).
63. See John T. Noonan, Choice of a Profession, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 381, 383 (1994).
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our most prestigious law schools,' attest, morality in the legal profession is
in a free fall.
V. SAMMONS' LAWYER-AS-RHETORICIAN
Sammons identifies James Boyd White's lawyer-as-rhetorician as his
preferred model for good lawyering.65 He suggests that enabling the client
to tell her story and engage in a conversation with the community is the key
lawyer skill. We join Sammons in praising this aspect of the lawyer's work,
although we would prefer to think of the lawyer as storyteller, rather than
rhetorician-rhetoric can distort,' and our understanding of Sammons
lawyer is that he is one who accurately tells the client's story. Sammons
identifies three tasks of lawyers that precede telling the client's story to the
community: (1) listening to the client's story; (2) putting the client's story
into language that is understandable to the community; and (3) finding the
proper forum in which to tell the client's story.67
The lawyer-as-rhetorician (or storyteller) focuses on a different aspect
of lawyering than our book does. Our book is concerned with moral
counseling by lawyers. If we did a book on client interviewing, trial
preparation, negotiation, or litigation we might choose the rhetorician as a
useful reference. The notion that the lawyer's job is to present the story of
the client to the community, to further the community's conversation about
justice is compatible with our notion of the lawyer-as-friend. Our book,
focuses on the lawyer's counseling activity, but helping the client tell her
story is also the action of a friend. Perhaps the two notions meet when the
lawyer who helps the client tell his story (Sammons' proposal) helps the
client to understand the stories of others (our proposal). The conversation
would move in both directions. We suggest that the lawyer should be
concerned about both ends of the conversation. At their best, lawyers
enhance communication on both ends of the conversation; at their worst,
they distort it on both ends.
64. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) and KRONMAN, supra note
44.
65. Sammons, supra note 1, at 44-45.
66. Sammons cites Martha Nussbaum's description of "Hecuba's time":
"[C]ommunication is replaced by persuasive rhetoric, and speech becomes a matter of taking
advantage of the other party's susceptibility." Sammons, supra note 1, at 66 n.207 (citing
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 415 (1986)).
67. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 90-95 (1986).
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Sammons' lawyer can have a moral impact on the client. Listening to
the client, exploring who she is, can change who she is. 68 As a part of
preparation, Sammons suggests that lawyers discuss with clients the morals
of the community and whether the story of the client will be persuasive to
the community; 69 this can change the client. But Sammons gives us little
account of the moral counseling of his lawyer; Sammons does not tell us
how the lawyer and client make decisions.
Sammons suggests that for the lawyer-as-rhetorician, morals come into
the conversation as a matter of technique. Sammons says, "[W]e explore
morals with our clients because we cannot speak persuasively for them in
any other way." " This is just not so: If the lawyer's only goal is to win,
delay, deceit, and distorting the position of others, to name only a few, are
also in the lawyer's bag of tricks; honest moral argument may be ineffective,
unpersuasive simply because it is honest moral argument. (That may have
happened to Atticus Finch in the trial of Tom Robinson.71) Sammons may
have gotten moral discourse on the agenda of the lawyer-client conference,
but we suggest that his lawyer is deceiving his client as well as himself.
Maybe Sammons would argue that distortion, delay, and deception are
inconsistent with the ideal of the lawyer-as-rhetorician, whose goal is honest
moral argument to the community. If so, it is now Sammons who is
running counter to the trend in the legal profession; it is now Sammons who
speaks from outside the practice. His model differs, at significant places,
with the common teaching of the profession-a fact for which he takes our
lawyer-as-friend to task. If the goal of the lawyer is to further discussion
within the community, the profession has taken up odd ways of doing so.
The practice of law often involves some level of deception, much of it
allowed (some would say required) by the rules of the profession. Books
on advocacy teach that lawyers should do their utmost to convince juries
that they believe in their cause (without saying so); that they should do what
they can to keep out damaging, even truthful (maybe especially truthful),
testimony; that they should do what they can (within the bounds of the law)
to keep the other side from gaining access to damaging evidence; that they
should make arguments to judges based, not on what they believe the law
should be, but on the interpretation of the law that would be in the client's
interest; and that in negotiations they should lie about theirs and their
clients' true valuation of claims. The danger of the adversary system gone
68. NUSSBAUM, supra note 67, at 91.
69. NUSSBAUM, supra note 67, at 92.
70. NUSSBAUM, supra note 67, at 94.
71. He showed the jury their prejudice, when an appeal to white patronage might have
been more successful.
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wild is that the lawyer distorts the client's story in order to win, which does
not further any conversation. For the lawyer-as-friend, the temptation
toward distortion, delay, and duress should be the subject of moral discourse
with the client.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LAWYER'S INTEGRITY, THE CLIENT'S INTEGRITY,
AND COMMUNITY
Sammons discerns that the motivation for our developing the lawyer-as-
friend is a concern for the integrity of our students.72 That is part of our
concern: too often, the models of lawyers presented to students have no
place for the students' integrity. But two other concerns also influenced the
development of the lawyer-as-friend: the integrity of the client and respect
for community.
There is a danger that the integrity of the client will be overwhelmed
by the moral paternalism of the guru lawyer." One of the strengths of
Sammons' article is his identification of the risk that the lawyer-as-friend
will be an unconscious guru, manipulating the client toward the lawyer's
perception of right, rather than involving the client in moral discourse.7 4
There is a danger that the lawyer will err either on the side of imposing her
values or on the side of ignoring moral values. Developing the ability, the
skill, to initiate and carry on such conversations without imposition is a
challenge.
The risk of imposition, however, does not lead us to abandon our
preference for the lawyer-as-friend, although we hope that we are and our
students will be aware of the risks of moral imperialism and self-deception.
Recognition of those risks is the first--and maybe the most important-step
in dealing with the danger of lawyer imperialism. Even with the recognition
of the risks, imposition is a danger. Lawyers cannot read their clients'
minds, lawyers cannot know all of the effects of all of what they say on
clients. Clients are used to being told what to do by paternalistic profes-
72. Again, we see integrity, not in the lonely, individualistic way suggested by
Sammons, but as a character trait that is formed and maintained in a moral community.
73. We are also concerned that the client's integrity will be overwhelmed by the amoral
paternalism of the godfather lawyer. The godfather lawyer poses risks to both the integrity
of the lawyer and the client.
74. Sammons' concern was also a concern of another thoughtful writer who has
influenced our thinking, the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. Buber concluded that moral
counseling within a professional relationship would always be parental. He said, "I see that
you mean being on the same plane, but you cannot .. " See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra
note 4, at 37 (quoting MARTIN BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 171-72 (M. Friedman &
R. Smith trans., 1965).
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sionals; it may be difficult to get them involved as equal players. The moral
life has risks, and there are risks to moral discourse. But we think that the
risks are worth it.
The other motivation behind our development of the lawyer-as-friend
is our respect for community, a hope that ours will be more than a society
of rank strangers. Sammons draws the title of his review from the gospel
classic, "Rank Strangers." He argues that lawyers should treat clients as
rank strangers. Otherwise, he says, the lawyer's personal morality might
slip in and influence the client; such are the dangers of friendship. The first
verse and chorus of "Rank Strangers" reads (sings) as follows:
I wandered again to my home in the mountains
where in youth's early dawn I was happy and free
I looked for my friends but I never could find them
I found they were all rank strangers to me.
Everybody I met seemed to be a rank stranger
No mother or dad, not a friend could I see
They knew not my name and I knew not their faces
I found they were all rank strangers to me.75
The song is a longing for friendship, a desire for more than autonomy, a
desire for community. This is a common complaint in America.
Our suggestion that the lawyer-client relationship might be a place for
community may seem an odd one. Surely community is more the concern
of home, neighborhood, and religious congregation than of the law office.
Part of our argument for the law office as a place to start building
community is that we all need to begin to rebuild community wherever we
are: Bloom where you are planted. But in another respect, the law office
may be a place where friendship is especially needed. Often, the people
who come to lawyers are like the ones who sing Rank Strangers. They may
have been abandoned by family and neighbors. They are in need of a
friend. The subject of the lawyer's representation is likely to be the client's
greatest concern, and the lawyer may be one person the client can trust with
that concern.
75. A. E. Brumley, Rank Strangers to Me.
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